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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 In 2013, a Texas oil company hydraulically fractured an uncon-
ventional oil well for the first time in Florida.1 The exploration took 
place in Collier County, located in the Everglades—a treasured natu-
ral area that has been described as “a river of grass flowing imper-
ceptibly from the hinterland into the sea.”2 This United Nations Edu-
cational, Scientific and Cultural Organization World Heritage Site 
contains vast subtropical wetlands and is a sanctuary for endangered 
species like the manatee, American crocodile, and Florida panther.3 
But local residents fear that new methods of oil extraction, including 
the use of hydraulic fracturing (also known as “fracking”)4 could af-
fect the character of these treasured wetlands and their drinking wa-
ter supply. Matthew Schwartz, executive director of South Florida 
Wildlands Association, fears for the nearby wildlife, worrying that 
“the current rash of applications for horizontal drilling and seismic 
                                                                                                                                 
 ? J.D. Candidate 2016, Florida State University College of Law. I would like to 
thank my family for their continuous love and support. I would also like to thank Professor 
Hannah Wiseman, Florida State University College of Law, for her helpful guidance and 
feedback. 
 1. See Press Release, Florida Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Statement from DEP Regarding 
Consent Order with the Dan A. Hughes Company, L.P. (Apr. 18, 2014) [hereinafter FDEP 
Press Release], available at http://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/FLDEP/bulletins/ 
b1683b.  
 2. Everglades National Park, UNESCO WORLD HERITAGE CENTRE, 
http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/76 (last visited Dec. 8, 2014). 
 3. America’s Everglades – The Largest Subtropical Wilderness in the United States, 
U.S. NAT’L PARK SERVICE, http://www.nps.gov/ever/index.htm (last updated Mar. 4, 2015). 
 4. Hydraulic fracturing is also referred to as “fracking” or “fracing.” Members of the 
oil and gas industry disfavor the word “fracking,” because they believe the term was coined 
by environmental groups to imply negative impacts associated with the industry and to 
suggest the fictional expletive, “frak,” used in Battlestar Galactica. In using “fracking,” this 
Note does not intend to connote anything negative about the oil and gas industry. Instead, 
this Note uses the more dominant spelling of the term. John M. Golden & Hannah J. 
Wiseman, The Fracking Revolution: A Case Study in Policy Levers to Promote Innovation, 
64 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2015). 
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testing will be impacting and degrading the last remaining habitat 
for the Florida panther.”5 The foremost concern for Mary Jean Yon, 
legislative director at Audubon Florida, is “the amount of water used 
to carry out this process.”6 And in his letter to the Environmental 
Protection Agency, Senator Bill Nelson of Florida declared, “We can-
not tolerate expanded industrial drilling activities that pose a threat 
to the drinking and surface water so close to the Florida Ever-
glades.”7 He continued by asking the agency to consider “whether 
outside wildcatters would soil one of the world’s great environmental 
treasures.”8  
 However, others disagree with what they view as extreme rhetoric 
and premature fears. Collier Resources Company, which leases min-
eral rights and monitors oil production, has operated safely for over 
six decades and “with minimal impacts to the surrounding environ-
ment.”9 Not only do the two families that jointly own Collier Re-
sources Company stand to benefit from further oil exploration, but 
many Collier County residents who may receive employment from 
the well projects do as well. Additionally, Americans across the coun-
try are likely to welcome the increase in the domestic supply of oil 
and gas, which has driven gas prices to record lows.10 Beyond discus-
sions over potential risks and benefits of fracking is the question of 
how to best regulate the industry. John Dwyer, a citizen of Collier 
County, critiqued advanced oil extraction in southwest Florida at a 
county commissioner meeting by stating, “The kingpins of carbon 
have blackened the façade of democracy.”11 Hydraulic fracturing not 
only raises particularized concerns over water contamination and 
quality of life, but also questions whether fracking is being governed 
in a democratic way. Effective governance over fracking may quell 
                                                                                                                                 
 5. Roger Drouin, Could Florida Become the New Fracking Frontier?, TRUTHOUT (Feb. 
4, 2014, 9:31 AM), http://truth-out.org/news/item/21642-fracking-florida-could-florida-
become-the-new-fracking-frontier.  
 6. Id.  
 7. Paresh Dave, Oil Drilling Near Everglades Prompts Worries About Fracking, Wa-
ter, L.A. TIMES (May 2, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://touch.latimes.com/#section/-1/article/p2p-
80077588/.  
 8. Id. 
 9. Environment, COLLIER RESOURCES COMPANY, http://www.collierresources.com/ 
Environment (last visited Dec. 11, 2014) (explaining that the Big Cypress Swamp Advisory 
Committee has independently reviewed and recommended approval of the Collier Re-
sources Company’s oil exploration in Big Cypress). 
 10. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 2012 BRIEF: AVERAGE WHOLESALE NATURAL GAS 
PRICES FELL 31% IN 2012, available at http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm? 
id=9490.  
 11. Board of County Commissioners Meeting, COLLIER COUNTY (Sept. 23, 2014), 
http://collier.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=4&clip_id=1807 (accessed from the 
meeting video archive).  
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exaggerated fears, engage locals in making decisions about their 
communities, and promote the best practices by the oil industry. 
 Many of the governance questions associated with fracking arise 
from an unclear balance of state and local authority. Even where 
states have expressly preempted local governance of oil and gas de-
velopment, some courts have found that there is room for local gov-
ernance;12 whereas in other states that appear to allow local govern-
ment control, courts have eliminated local involvement, finding “im-
plied” conflicts or field preemption.13 Achieving accountable, effective 
governance of oil and gas requires closer analysis of state and local 
authority and of the ways in which these governments could collabo-
rate, rather than compete or engage in “zero-sum”14 decisions, such as 
development bans, in this increasingly important regulatory area. 
While much of the state-local governance literature in the oil and gas 
context has focused on preemption conflicts and bans,15 this Note is 
about finding a middle ground. By drawing from accounts of dynamic 
federalism literature, this Note shows how shared local and state 
control can work in Collier County and how other states can learn 
from this approach.  
 This Note uses a case study to illuminate how a local government 
is choosing to deal with the national issue of a Texas company com-
ing into its jurisdiction to engage in hydraulic fracturing. Collier 
County has addressed its concerns surrounding fracking of the Colli-
er-Hogan Well through both cooperation and conflict—using adminis-
trative law battles and collaborative approaches with the state to 
regulate fracking rather than attempting to zone out or altogether 
ban fracking.16 This approach provides broader lessons for other local 
governments on choosing how to effectively regulate the advancing 
oil industry. Building from this county-based case study, this Note 
will argue that governing hydraulic fracturing through state-local 
dynamic federalism is necessary to achieve goals of adequate envi-
ronmental protection and to respect local interests. 
                                                                                                                                 
 12. See, e.g., Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 16 N.E.3d 1188 (N.Y. 2014), reargument 
denied, 20 N.E.3d 650 (N.Y. 2014). 
 13. See Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. City of Longmont, No. 13CV63, 2014 WL 3690665 
(Colo. Dist. Ct. July 24, 2014) (trial court order finding the ordinance invalid because of 
conflict preemption); Ne. Natural Energy, L.L.C. v. City of Morgantown, No. 11-C-411, 
2011 WL 3584376 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 2011) (trial court order finding the ordinance 
invalid based on field preemption).    
 14. See Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 4 (2011). 
 15. See generally Shaun A. Goho, Commentary, Municipalities and Hydraulic Frac-
turing: Trends in State Preemption, 64 PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 3, 3 (2012); Francis Gradijan, 
State Regulations, Litigation, and Hydraulic Fracturing, 7 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 
47 (2012); Bruce M. Kramer, Federal Legislative and Administrative Regulation of Hydrau-
lic Fracturing Operations, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 837 (2012). 
 16. See infra Part II. 
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 This Note begins by describing the process of hydraulic fracturing 
and exploring the potential benefits and risks associated with the 
process. Part II introduces a fracking dispute between a southwest 
Florida county, a Texas oil company, and the Florida Department of 
Environmental Protection (FDEP). Part III discusses the state of the 
law in Florida regarding fracking. Part IV then explores the current 
governance options for local governments in Florida, including local 
power and state preemption, with examples of how other states and 
their respective local governments approach fracking. Finally, Part V 
makes a novel argument that state-local dynamic federalism is the 
most effective solution to regulate hydraulic fracturing.17  
II.   HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 
 Because there is broad public concern about the impacts of frack-
ing,18 this Note will focus on effective governance of the enhanced ex-
traction process. This analysis could have focused on other goals as-
sociated with fracking, such as maximizing economic interest. Alt-
hough environmental protection and regulations are not necessarily 
to the exclusion of economic benefits—and some public officials are 
most enthusiastic about growth and taxes—the public at large is con-
cerned with the impacts of fracking, especially water contamina-
tion.19 Therefore, this Note focuses on the greatest public demand, 
particularly in Florida, which appears to be effectively regulating the 
industry, and explores how state and local authorities can best 
achieve this goal.  
 Hydraulic fracturing is a technique used to extract oil and natural 
gas that is trapped beneath the earth’s surface, specifically oil and 
                                                                                                                                 
 17. Of course, other scholars have proposed the concept of state-local in regulatory 
contexts, but without also discussing dynamic federalism. See generally Paul Diller, Intra-
state Preemption, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 1113 (2007); John R. Nolon & Steven E. Gavin, Hydro-
fracking: State Preemption, Local Power, and Cooperative Governance, 63 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 995 (2013), available at http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/884/ (discussing 
state and local governments working together in the hydraulic fracturing context but argu-
ing for a cooperative governance approach rather than arguing for dynamic federalism). 
Dynamic federalism has been applied to the hydraulic fracturing industry but not to the 
state-local level. See Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 
72 MD. L. REV. 773 (2013). 
 18. Jonathan Groves, Rule 29 Or: How the Railroad Commission Learned to Stop 
Worrying and Love Hydraulic Fracturing, 14 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 195, 201 (2012). 
 19. Steve Brooks, UT Energy Poll Shows Divide on Fracking, KNOW (Apr. 9, 2013), 
http://www.utexas.edu/know/2013/04/09/ut-energy-poll-shows-divide-on-fracking/ (public 
survey finding that water contamination is the public’s number one environmental con-
cern); see also Mike Soraghan, Obscure Regulator Hits Brakes on Northeast Shale Drilling 
Rush, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/09/13/13greenwire-
obscure-regulator-hits-brakes-on-northeast-sha-11558.html?scp=3&sq=fracturing&st=cse 
(describing groundwater quality as the public’s central concern).  
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gas that is found within the pores of underground rock.20 Many wells 
are first horizontally drilled to expose more pores in the rock before 
operators fracture around the wellbore.21 During this well develop-
ment process, operators drill wells thousands of feet into rock for-
mations22 and inject fracturing fluid—which contains mostly water—
and also a propping agent—usually sand—and a mixture of chemical 
additives.23 The fracturing fluid is injected at a very high pressure to 
fracture the rock and to release gas.24 There is little public infor-
mation available about the chemicals used during the extraction pro-
cess.25 This lack of disclosure makes it hard to determine the poten-
tial risks involved.26 However, information available to the public is 
increasing as a result of FracFocus27 and state chemical disclosure 
regulations.28  
 Advocates of fracking assert that oil and gas exploration stands to 
improve local communities through investment, job growth, and tax-
es.29 However, fracking can also produce negative economic impacts 
on communities.30 Oil and gas exploration can yield “a local economy 
that is overly dependent on one industry, leading to lower economic 
resilience, greater income inequality, and less educated workforces.”31 
Beyond potential adverse economic effects, opponents of fracking are 
concerned about environmental and public health risks.32  
 One of the foremost concerns regarding fracking is water contam-
ination.33 While there is ongoing scientific dispute about the extent to 
                                                                                                                                 
 20. BRANDON J. MURRILL & ADAM VANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42461, 
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING: CHEMICAL DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 1 (2012), available at 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42461.pdf. 
 21. See Evan J. House, Fractured Fairytales: The Failed Social License for Unconven-
tional Oil and Gas Development, 13 WYO. L. REV. 5, 19 (2013). 
 22. Id. at 24. 
 23. Goho, supra note 15.   
 24. Id. 
 25. See Hannah Wiseman, Trade Secrets, Disclosure, and Dissent in a Fracturing 
Energy Revolution, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 1, 4 (2011).   
 26. Id. at 9.  
 27. FracFocus is a chemical disclosure registry. About Us, FRACFOCUS, 
http://www.fracfocus.org/welcome (last visited on Dec. 11, 2014). 
 28. MURRILL & VANN, supra note 20, at 4-18. 
 29. See TIMOTHY CONSIDINE ET AL., AN EMERGING GIANT: PROSPECTS AND ECONOMIC 
IMPACTS OF DEVELOPING THE MARCELLUS SHALE NATURAL GAS PLAY 17-19 (2009), availa-
ble at http://marcelluscoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/EconomicImpactsofDevelop 
ingMarcellus.pdf.  
 30. Goho, supra note 15, at 4.  
 31. Id.  
 32. Nolon & Gavin, supra note 17.  
 33. Jarit C. Polley, Uncertainty for the Energy Industry: A Fractured Look at Home 
Rule, 34 ENERGY L.J. 261, 264 (2013).  
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which fracking can contaminate underground water, 34  inadequate 
well casing is one such way that water contamination can occur.35 
Faulty well casing can cause methane to leak from wells; and fractur-
ing fluid migrating through the casing can also pollute the under-
ground water resources.36 Additionally, on-site storage and off-site 
disposal of wastewater, also known as “flowback water,” which is the 
fluid mixture that returns to the surface,37 has the potential to cause 
further contamination.38 Air pollution is yet another environmental 
and public health concern. In addition to pollution caused by trucking 
equipment and thousands of gallons of water, the fracking process 
emits “volatile organic compounds and methane” into the air, which 
generates public health hazards and may also affect climate change.39 
Further, fracking can alter the quality of life for local residents.40 
Truck traffic, noise, and visual impacts have the potential to change 
the character of communities in undesirable ways.41 Finally, injecting 
wastewater from drilling operations has caused earthquakes—many 
of them minor but some of which have been substantial.42 Because 
these risks “are felt most acutely in local communities,”43 meaningful 
                                                                                                                                 
 34. Hannah J. Wiseman, Risk and Response in Fracturing Policy, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 
729, 740 (2013) (showing there is little proof that fracturing itself has caused groundwater 
contamination). 
 35. See, e.g., BUREAU OF OIL & GAS MGMT., PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., STRAY 
NATURAL GAS MIGRATION ASSOCIATED WITH OIL AND GAS WELLS (Oct. 28, 2009), available 
at http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/subject/advcoun/oil_gas/2009/Stray%20Gas%20Migration 
%20Cases.pdf (showing improperly cased wells have caused methane contamination of 
water). 
 36. Nathaniel R. Warner et al., Geochemical Evidence for Possible Natural Migration 
of Marcellus Formation Brine to Shallow Aquifers in Pennsylvania, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. 
SCI. 11961, 11965 (2012), available at http://nofracking.com/static/media/PDF/PNAS- 
2012-Warner-1121181109.pdf.  
 37. Hydraulic Fracturing Defined, GEOLOGICAL SOC’Y OF AM., 
http://www.geosociety.org/criticalissues/hydraulicFracturing/defined.asp (last visited Mar. 
8, 2015). 
 38. See N.M. OIL CONSERVATION DIV., CASES WHERE PIT SUBSTANCES CONTAMINATED 
NEW MEXICO’S GROUND WATER (2008), http://www.emnrd.state.nm.us/ocd/documents/ 
GWImpactPublicRecordsSixColumns20081119.pdf (suggesting that various substances 
from pits can leak into groundwater); Daniel J. Rozell & Sheldon J. Reaven, Water Pollu-
tion Risk Associated with Natural Gas Extraction from the Marcellus Shale, 32 RISK 
ANALYSIS 1382, 1388-89 (2011) (describing how surface spills and leaks from surface pits 
can contaminate water). 
 39. Nolon & Gavin, supra note 17, at 997.  
 40. Goho, supra note 15, at 4.  
 41. Id. 
 42. Cliff Frohlich et al., The Dallas-Fort Worth Earthquake Sequence: October 2008 
Through May 2009, 101 BULL. SEISMOLOGICAL SOC’Y AM. 327, 327 (2011) (assessing the 
relationship between the small Dallas-Fort Worth earthquakes and activities associated 
with the natural gas production in Tarrant County); Katie M. Keranen et al., Potentially 
Induced Earthquakes in Oklahoma, USA: Links Between Wastewater Injection and the 
2011 Mw 5.7 Earthquake Sequence, 41 GEOLOGY 699, 699-700 (2013). 
 43. Goho, supra note 15, at 4.  
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participation from local governments is critical to effectively mitigate 
the risks and to regulate the advancing oil and gas industry.  
 Energy experts believed that the United States would soon ex-
haust its natural gas until the 1990s when Texas oil and gas compa-
nies perfected the fracturing process.44 Hydraulic fracturing has since 
spread to other shale formations, including the Fayetteville for-
mation in Arkansas; the Marcellus formation in New York, Pennsyl-
vania, Ohio, and West Virginia,45 among others; and most recently 
the limestone formation in Florida.46 Technologies have rapidly ad-
vanced, allowing fracking to greatly increase in recent years—so 
much so that President Barack Obama has described America as the 
“Saudi Arabia of natural gas.”47 Regulations, however, need to catch 
up to this advancing technology. While local and state governments 
in the Fayetteville and Marcellus shale states traditionally regulate 
fracking through zoning, municipal bans, and preemption, the Flori-
da case study explored in this Note can show states how a non-
traditional approach that strikes a balance between state and local 
control over oil and gas development is most effective. 
III.   THE COLLIER-HOGAN WELL DISPUTE 
 In 2013, the Dan A. Hughes Company (Hughes Company) intro-
duced hydraulic fracturing of an unconventional well to Florida.48 
FDEP Secretary Herschel Vinyard reported that the enhanced oil 
extraction process had never been done in Florida prior to the 
Hughes Company.49 However, oil wells have existed in Florida for 
over seventy years, with one oil field in the State’s panhandle and 
another in Collier County.50 In 2003, FDEP reported that fracking 
was used experimentally in conventional wells in the Jay Field.51 
FDEP identifies conventional wells as ones that are not horizontally 
drilled; therefore, the 2013 fracking of an unconventional well, one 
                                                                                                                                 
 44. Wiseman, supra note 25, at 3.   
 45. Id. 
 46. See Brief for Petitioner at 2, Collier Cnty. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Case No. 14-
0012 (DEP June 12, 2014). 
 47. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on American-Made Energy 
(Jan. 26, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2012/ 
01/26/president-obama-discusses-blueprint-american-made-energy#transcirpt).  
 48. FDEP Press Release, supra note 1. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Greg Allen, Florida County Goes to Court Over ‘Acid Fracking’ Near Everglades, 
NPR ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (July 2, 2014, 5:31 PM), available at http://www.npr.org/ 
2014/07/02/327373952/florida-county-goes-to-court-over-acid-fracking-near-everglades.  
 51. Memorandum from John Littlejohn, Deputy Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., to 
Herschel T. Vinyard Jr., Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Sept. 29, 2011), available at 
http://news.caloosahatchee.org/docs/Dep_Fracturing_Response_130118.pdf.   
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that was horizontally drilled before being fractured, is new to Florida 
and might pose significant risks to groundwater.52  
 While fracking has been successful in shale-type formations, the 
technique will not necessarily be effective in Florida’s limestone for-
mation, which lies at least ten thousand feet beneath the earth’s sur-
face.53 The particular geological concern over horizontal drilling in 
Collier County is that it is “located over a Karstic Aquifer system 
with non-contiguous porous confining layers consisting mostly of 
sandstone, dolomite, and shell beds which are particularly vulnerable 
to any pollution sources.”54 The novelty of fracking to Florida, the 
current lack of state legislation regarding fracking, the particular 
geological structure of Collier County, the uniqueness of the Ever-
glades, and the large local public outcry against advanced oil extrac-
tion make fracking in Collier County ripe for a case study.  
 In December 2012, FDEP issued a permit to the Hughes Company 
to construct a well in Collier County.55 Then, in August 2013, FDEP 
issued an operation permit to the Hughes Company to operate the 
well as an oil production well.56 On December 23, 2013, the Hughes 
Company issued a well completion procedure notice, also called a 
workover notice, to FDEP.57 The workover notice proposed fracking 
as its method to extract oil from the Collier-Hogan Well,58 although 
FDEP refers to the fracking process used here as “an enhanced ex-
traction procedure.”59 FDEP was concerned about the workover notice 
because the Hughes Company’s suggested method of extracting oil 
had not previously been performed in Florida.60  
 Concerned with the potential risks of fracking and desiring to fur-
ther study the process, FDEP asked the Hughes Company to suspend 
its operation of the workover procedure. 61  However, the Hughes 
Company commenced with its planned operation and without FDEP 
approval; thus, the Hughes Company can be credited with one of the 
first fracking operations in Florida.62 On December 31, 2013, upon 
                                                                                                                                 
 52. Allen, supra note 50. However, FDEP has not found any contamination in the 
Collier-Hogan Well. Board of County Commissioners Meeting, COLLIER COUNTY (Sept. 9, 
2014), http://www.colliergov.net/index.aspx?page=2280 (accessed from the meeting video 
archive).  
 53. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 46, at 2, 8. 
 54. Id. at 8. 
 55. Consent Order, Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Dan A. Hughes Co., Case No. 14-0012 
(DEP Apr. 8, 2014). 
 56. Id. 
 57. FDEP Press Release, supra note 1.  
 58. See id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id.  
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notification that the workover procedure had taken place, FDEP is-
sued a Cease and Desist Order.63 On April 8, 2014, FDEP and the 
Hughes Company signed a Consent Order, in which the Hughes 
Company agreed to pay a $25,000 settlement and to install ground-
water monitors, among other obligations.64  
 Collier County did not learn about the Collier-Hogan Well incident 
until April 18, 2014, three months after the Cease and Desist Order 
was issued.65 The press release issued by FDEP was not only the first 
time Collier County learned that fracking had occurred but also the 
first time FDEP expressed its concern that the Hughes Company’s 
action could adversely affect the County’s groundwater, which its res-
idents rely on for drinking water.66 A state-local governance dispute 
thus began as an administrative battle between Collier County and 
FDEP.67 Collier County filed claims against the state agency demand-
ing that FDEP better regulate hydraulic fracturing.68 Specifically, the 
County challenged FDEP’s Consent Order and improper issuance of 
the Hughes Company’s permits.69 Meanwhile, the Hughes Company 
fell behind on the obligations upon which it agreed in the Consent 
Order, prompting FDEP to revoke every permit the Hughes Company 
had in Florida and to file suit in Collier County Circuit Court against 
the Hughes Company.70  
 Contemporaneous to the County’s administrative challenge 
against FDEP, the agency drilled groundwater monitors to determine 
whether the water had been contaminated at the Collier-Hogan 
Well.71 FDEP also hired independent experts to investigate the well 
site to determine the effects, if any, of this new extraction process.72 
FDEP noted that it desired to increase the scope of inspection re-
quirements, increase its legislative authority to regulate, and place 
the burden of clean-up requirements on oil companies rather than 
tax payers.73 
                                                                                                                                 
 63. In re Dan A. Hughes Co., Final Order Requiring Operations at Well 20-3H Collier-
Hogan Cease and Desist (DEP Dec. 31, 2013). 
 64. Consent Order, Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Dan A. Hughes Co., Case No. 14-0012 
(DEP Apr. 8, 2014). 
 65. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 46, at 3-4. 
 66. Id. at 3.  
 67. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 46, at 9-10. 
 68. See id. 
 69. Id. at 4, 9-10. 
 70. Consent Order, Fla. Dep’t Envtl. Prot. v. Dan A. Hughes Co., Case No. 14-0012 
(DEP Apr. 8, 2014). 
 71. Board of County Commissioners Meeting, supra note 52. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
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 FDEP invited the Collier County Commission and the Southwest 
Conservancy—a nonprofit organization that serves to protect south-
west Florida’s water, land, and wildlife74—to join its suit.75 At the 
County Commissioner Meeting, the Board of County Commissioners 
suggested withdrawing its suit against FDEP on the condition that 
FDEP issue a commitment letter to continue holding the Hughes 
Company accountable, continue testing for possible contamination at 
the Collier-Hogan Well, and commit to furthering legislation that 
supports regulation of the advancing technologies in the oil and gas 
industry.76 The Southwest Conservancy declined its invitation to join 
FDEP’s suit against the Hughes Company; instead, the Conservancy 
secured a stipulated agreement with FDEP in return for its volun-
tary withdrawal from its petition to intervene in the FDEP Consent 
Order case.77 The Conservancy obtained many legally binding com-
mitments, including that FDEP must identify which chemicals it 
must test for and declare what steps will be taken if contamination is 
found.78 Although the Conservancy was disappointed that the County 
so readily discussed dropping its suit from FDEP without a legally 
binding commitment from the agency, the Conservancy now supports 
the County’s withdrawal from its suit against FDEP since the Con-
servancy is content with the legally binding commitment it secured.79 
The Conservancy was even supportive of the County joining its stipu-
lated agreement with FDEP.80  
 After securing its own stipulated agreement with FDEP regard-
ing, specifically, the Collier-Hogan Well and, more broadly, a com-
mitment by FDEP to assist and pursue legislative action, the County 
withdrew its administrative challenge against the state agency.81 The 
County also accepted an invitation from FDEP to join its suit against 
the Hughes Company.82 Joining the suit allowed the County to sit at 
the table and meaningfully participate in holding the Hughes Com-
pany responsible for its actions. Commissioner Tim Nance, however, 
explained that the County’s intervening in the FDEP lawsuit is only 
one piece of the puzzle.83 Mr. Nance analogizes Collier County’s rela-
                                                                                                                                 
 74. Our Work, CONSERVANCY OF SW. FLA., http://www.conservancy.org/our-work (last 
visited Dec. 8, 2014). 
 75. Board of County Commissioners Meeting, supra note 52. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Board of County Commissioners Meeting, COLLIER COUNTY (Oct. 14, 2014), 
http://www.colliergov.net/index.aspx?page=2280 (accessed from the meeting video archive). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
2015]  GOVERNING HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 877 
 
tionship with fracking to a movie. Litigation over the Collier-Hogan 
Well is like a preview to a film; the litigation is a preliminary mes-
sage for the forthcoming big picture. Legislation, Mr. Nance purports, 
is the feature.84 He believes that true regulation of the oil and gas 
industry will occur at the legislative level. Nevertheless, Collier 
County’s actions are critical to triggering regulatory activity and to 
keeping pressure on the State.  
 The Collier-Hogan Well serves as an interesting case study as to 
how a local government, a state agency, and a nonprofit organization 
are working together to regulate fracking. At the forefront of the 
commissioners’ and Conservancy members’ minds is the importance 
of effectively mitigating the potential impact of fracking on water 
quality and endangered species.85 FDEP is also invested in shaping 
how its policies address fracking.86 While the Collier-Hogan Well lo-
cated in the Everglades is just one example of fracking nationwide, 
the well has the potential to dictate how Florida will govern fracking 
practices in the future. The Florida case study also has the potential 
to show other states how local and state governments might be able 
to work either cooperatively or in conflict to effectively address issues 
associated with fracking.87 
IV.   LEGISLATION GOVERNING FRACKING 
 Florida’s oil and gas laws, written before fracking occurred within 
the state, do not reflect the current state of oil and gas technology. As 
a result of the unchanged laws, “these new methods of extraction do 
not always fit within the current regulatory framework.”88 The inci-
dent at the Collier-Hogan Well and the consequential disputes be-
tween FDEP, Collier County, the Hughes Company, and the South-
west Conservancy reveal the discrepancy between advancing tech-
nology and legislation. Some of Florida’s regulations of the oil and 
gas industry include requirements for obtaining a permit89 and envi-
ronmental protection requirements regarding harms such as pollu-
tion.90 Along with the Florida Statutes’ broad rules regarding oil and 
gas, FDEP writes its own administrative regulations. However, the 
State only regulates fracking through the workover notice require-
                                                                                                                                 
 84. Id. 
 85. Board of County Commissioners Meeting, supra note 52 (commissioners speaking 
about their ongoing concerns regarding fracking); Our Work, supra note 74. 
 86. Board of County Commissioners Meeting, supra note 52. 
 87. See infra Part 0.  
 88. Inappropriate Oil Drilling and Water Don’t Mix, CONSERVANCY OF SW. FLA., 
http://www.conservancy.org/policy/inappropriate-drilling-and-water-dont-mix (last visited 
Dec. 10, 2014).  
 89. FLA. STAT. § 377.241 (2013). 
 90. Id. § 377.371. 
878  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:867 
 
ment, which requires operators to notify FDEP before beginning a 
workover operation.91  
 Within this somewhat old set of regulations, the Hughes Compa-
ny’s only obligation pursuant to Florida’s statutes and administrative 
codes was to give FDEP notice of its intent to engage in the advanced 
extraction procedure, which it did through its December 23, 2013, 
workover notice. The Hughes Company maintains that “at all times 
it was operating lawfully under a valid permit and followed all appli-
cable procedures required to conduct the Workover Operations . . . .”92 
The fact that the Hughes Company did nothing illegal—although it 
disregarded FDEP’s request to cease operations and was subsequent-
ly sued—reveals the need for legislative reform for the benefit of all 
parties.  
 Currently there is an absence of laws regulating fracking; howev-
er, the void should not be attributed to a lack of proposals. In Flori-
da’s last legislative session, Representative Ray Rodrigues proposed 
House Bill 71, which would have required companies to inform FDEP 
of the chemicals they use in the well development process and to for-
ward the information to the national registry.93 House Bill 71, among 
other bills seeking to regulate fracking, died in committee.94 The 2015 
legislative session will offer an opportunity for Florida to regulate 
fracking and to include the County in the process, particularly 
through FDEP’s assistance.95  
 In addition to regulating fracking at the state legislative level, lo-
cal zoning and altogether prohibition of fracking is a legitimate and 
often used option by local governments whose states have home rule 
power.96 In home rule power states, local governments have greater 
authority to regulate anything that affects their internal affairs.97 
However, home rule power varies substantially among states. In Col-
orado, for example, local governments have home rule power, but 
their regulations may only supersede those of the state if they relate 
to “matters of local concern.”98 A county court addressing a ban on 
fracturing in Longmont, Colorado, found that the regulation of frack-
ing is not a matter of local concern, because it affects national com-
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panies that cross local and county lines, and local regulation of frack-
ing may not conflict with state regulation.99 In states that follow Dil-
lon’s Rule, on the other hand, local governments only have the pow-
ers expressly and specifically delegated to them by the state through 
delegating acts.100 
 Florida is a home rule state and thus enjoys greater autonomy to 
address local concerns.101 However, Collier County did not even seem 
to consider zoning, much less the prohibition of fracking. One possi-
ble reason is that even home rule states have limited power in re-
gards to fracking, as exhibited by the Longmont case.102 Another rea-
son why Collier County may not have attempted to pass a zoning or-
dinance is Florida’s Bert J. Harris Act, which provides that “[w]hen a 
specific action of a governmental entity has inordinately burdened an 
existing use of real property or a vested right to a specific use of real 
property,” the property owner is entitled to relief.103 Although zoning 
is one governance option that the County could pursue, the Bert J. 
Harris Act may dissuade the County from the zoning of fracking be-
cause of a fear that it will be sued for placing too high of a burden on 
property owners.104 Even though Florida is mostly devoid of legisla-
tion regarding fracking, other traditional governance options are 
available in the meantime, including zoning, prohibition, and litiga-
tion of fracking; and overlapping state and local powers can make 
these governance options even more effective.  
V.   GOVERNANCE OPTIONS: 
LOCAL POWER VERSUS STATE PREEMPTION 
 Scholars define good governance in a variety of ways. For exam-
ple, effective governance has been envisioned under a utilitarian ap-
proach, which focuses on maximizing welfare.105 Others define effec-
tive governance by justice, an equitable distribution of costs and ben-
efits.106 This Note roughly follows a utility-based approach, because 
the maximization of welfare creates the fewest environmental costs 
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while maximizing the benefits of fracking. However, ensuring that 
citizens’ voices are heard—another element of good governance used 
within this Note—is a process-based concern, which moves the gov-
ernance approach beyond a purely utilitarian approach. Local partic-
ipation is important, because local residents are the ones experienc-
ing many of the benefits and costs of fracking: Landowners may be 
looking forward to an increase in the value of their land, while the 
potential neighbors to the oil extraction site may have anxieties over 
their health and the structure of their community.107 Accountable 
governance requires consideration of these local concerns. However, 
because “more benefits than costs spill beyond local boundaries” and 
the risks of fracking may be exaggerated, state governance is neces-
sary to prevent municipalities from overregulating and thereby de-
creasing welfare.108  
 As it is defined in this Note, effective governance balances compet-
ing interests, such as pursuing economic benefits and protecting the 
environment, and engages the critical actors in the regulatory pro-
cess. Moreover, effective governance demands dynamic interaction in 
the regulatory process between the state government, local govern-
ments, environmental groups, and the public. Effective governance is 
necessary to provide the oil and gas industry with clear expectations; 
to give state and local governments the opportunities to either con-
flict or cooperate with one another and thus to effectively experiment 
toward better policy; and to ensure that the concerns of environmen-
tal groups are heard. This Part discusses the current governance op-
tions for regulating fracking. However, these governance options are 
not the most effective means of addressing the state, local, and indus-
try-based concerns associated with hydraulic fracturing. Therefore, 
Part V suggests a more effective governance option in the form of 
state-local dynamic federalism. 
 Local governments regulate fracking through zoning ordinances, 
operational zoning, outright bans, and litigation. 109  Local govern-
ments derive their power to regulate oil and gas development from 
state governments.110 The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
gives the states police powers to protect public health, safety, and 
welfare.111 States then delegate certain police powers to local gov-
ernments. To determine the extent of powers granted by states to lo-
cal governments, the first step is to determine whether a state fol-
lows the home rule or Dillon’s Rule. In home rule states, local gov-
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ernments have the authority to regulate fracking to protect public 
health and safety.112 In Dillon’s Rule states, however, these powers 
must be expressly granted.113  
 Local governments can regulate where fracking occurs through 
zoning and land use restrictions, prohibiting fracking in certain zones 
and then designating which uses are allowed within each zone.114 Lo-
cal governments also regulate how fracking occurs through opera-
tional measures, which focus on the technical aspects of drilling.115 
Courts have tended to strike down operational measures while allow-
ing zoning and land use ordinances.116 The Pennsylvania Oil and Gas 
Act attempted to prevent zoning-based measures by expressly 
preempting local ordinances that purport to regulate oil and gas well 
operations.117 However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in two deci-
sions issued on the same day held that municipalities could regulate 
fracking through zoning ordinances that control the location of wells 
but that municipalities were prohibited from enacting operational 
ordinances.118  
 As introduced in Part III, outright bans are other ways that local 
governments are regulating fracking; however, these bans are more 
likely to be struck down in court than zoning ordinances that merely 
set limitations on the industry.119 For example, the City of Morgan-
town, West Virginia banned fracking120 based on the home rule char-
ter granted to it in West Virginia’s Constitution.121 A lower court 
judge struck down the outright ban on fracking and held that West 
Virginia’s interest in oil and gas development preempted the City’s 
ordinance.122 In response to the Morgantown ruling, two other local 
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governments repealed their fracking bans.123 West Virginia’s law is 
still unclear as to whether the state would actually preempt an ordi-
nance that bans fracking, as its Supreme Court has yet to rule on the 
issue.124 However, the Colorado Supreme Court has held that a mu-
nicipality’s total ban on fracking is impermissible.125  
 Meanwhile, litigation can be a vehicle for local governments to 
regain their power from states.126 New York courts have held that a 
complete ban on fracking, when carried out through zoning, is per-
missible.127 Furthermore, the New York municipalities’ decisions to 
litigate the preemption question, rather than submit to the preemp-
tion language found in New York’s Environmental Conservation 
Law, reinstated the local governments’ power to completely ban 
fracking through zoning.128  
 As local governments have expanded their regulation of fracking 
or enacted bans, many states have attempted to preempt municipal 
authority over oil and gas development.129 Preemption has been de-
fined as “the simultaneous expansion in power of a higher level of 
government and reduction in power of a lower level of government.”130 
The validity of preemption depends not only on the strength of home 
rule powers but also on the court’s interpretation of preemption lan-
guage.131 State preemption can be used to provide uniform regula-
tions, which creates a more predictable and stable environment for 
the private sector.132 States have legitimate interests in the develop-
ment of their natural resources, and they generally have more re-
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sources to enforce those regulations.133 On the other hand, oil and gas 
development creates local impacts, which municipalities have tradi-
tionally regulated through their zoning and police powers.134 Local 
governments may be better at addressing particularized harms; 
moreover, “the process of local governance is often viewed as democ-
racy at work.”135 Because local governments have unique visions of 
how they want to use their land, they are in ideal positions to find 
creative solutions to their problems. 136  Local governments should 
have the legal authority to realize their visions for their respective 
communities and to be free from the inhibitions of preemption.137  
 Although the risks of fracking can differ based on geology, there 
are certain shared risks and issues. The goal everywhere is effective 
governance. Collier County’s administrative battles and resolution 
with FDEP regarding hydraulic fracturing regulations reveal an im-
portant lesson the County has learned from Marcellus shale states: 
zoning laws and associated preemption debates are not the most ef-
fective answers to securing local interests.  
VI.   STATE-LOCAL DYNAMIC FEDERALISM 
 The governance options discussed in Part IV of this Note reflect 
the most common approaches to regulating fracking and suggest that 
authority should be allocated to either the state or the local govern-
ment. Viewing state and local authority as being mutually exclusive 
is similar to the concept of dual federalism, which rigidly separates 
state and federal power.138 The tendency to bifurcate authority be-
tween the two levels of government makes sense at first blush. A 
state agency such as FDEP may be deemed the more effective entity 
to regulate the oil and gas industry because of its resources and ex-
pertise. On the other hand, local communities are deeply affected by 
fracking and thus have major stakes in the matter. Additionally, 
states tend to be slow in altering their current regulations to confront 
the novel issues presented by fracking.139 While states have regulated 
oil and gas for a long time and are best equipped to do so,140 states 
have to take into account local interests and the localized effects of 
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fracking. Upon closer examination, it is clear that static governance 
is not sufficient to address both state and local concerns. In the fed-
eral-state context, either-or allocations of power neither accurately 
describe governance nor provide useful lessons for how governance 
allocations should occur. 141  Just as scholars have recognized that 
“dual federalism is dead,”142 the same recognition is needed at the 
state level.  
 Alternatively, some scholars have suggested that cooperative gov-
ernance is the proper approach to regulating fracking.143 However, 
this cooperative approach is often anemic, resulting in local govern-
ments taking passive roles in regulating, thus creating an absence of 
meaningful interaction between state and local government.144 For 
example, Colorado attempted to take a more cooperative approach to 
the regulation of fracking through the creation of the Oil and Gas 
Task Force.145 The task force encouraged each local government to 
name a designee to participate in the Colorado Oil and Gas Conser-
vation Commission, allowed designees to request an additional ten 
days to review permits, and provided them with technical training.146 
Although designees may consult with well operators, may file com-
plaints, and must be notified of an impending permit, there is a lack 
of opportunity for the designees to influence the state’s regulatory 
regime.147 Cooperative governance is similar to cooperative federal-
ism, in which cooperation means, “state and local governments ad-
minister and implement federal programs”148—the only difference 
here being that local governments administer state programs. In ad-
dition to being weak, cooperative governance in some cases simply 
might not be available. Because the federal government and the 
State of Florida have taken relatively unaggressive approaches to-
ward environmental regulation of oil and gas, cooperative federalism 
may not even be a possibility in Florida.149  
 Although cooperation facilitates collaboration between govern-
mental entities, conflict also has value.150 Further, effective govern-
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ance requires municipalities to take on greater, even dissenting, roles 
to ensure their interests are protected and to pressure policymakers 
to meaningfully deliberate.151 The best approach to regulate fracking 
does not come down to deciding whether the state or local governments 
is the optimal authority; likewise, effectively regulating the industry 
requires more than local governments passively engaging in the poli-
cies of states. Instead, state-local dynamic federalism, in which states 
and local governments cooperate and conflict in a dynamic and over-
lapping way, is the answer to the regulation of fracking.  
 Dynamic federalism reconceives federalism as a “dynamic rela-
tionship between state and federal authority”152 rather than as “mu-
tually exclusive spheres of power.”153 Dynamic federalism celebrates 
the benefits of overlapping jurisdiction, such as promoting effective 
governance, ensuring a regulatory safety net, and encouraging policy 
innovation.154 The benefits are particularly relevant in the environ-
mental context where jurisdictional overlap is common.155 The federal 
government often regulates issues that are local in nature, while 
states actively regulate areas with national and international ef-
fects.156 Particularly with respect to the issue of fracking, the noise, 
traffic, and location of oil and gas extraction collectively have a local-
ized effect,157 while pollution from fracking has a state, national, and 
even international impact.158 The concept and benefits of dynamic fed-
eralism are applicable to state and local governments, which this Note 
terms “state-local dynamic federalism.” While there has been a move 
toward exploring dynamic approaches at the federal-state level, such 
an approach has seldom been conceived of at the state-local level. 
 Effective governance is achieved through overlapping jurisdiction: 
one level of government’s regulatory activity triggers the other opti-
mal level of government to enact regulations.159 Once the jurisdiction 
that is most capable of optimal regulation has been identified, both 
levels of government should continue to have authority over the prob-
lem to maintain effective governance.160 Collier County uniquely en-
gaged in regulatory activity through litigation in which it demanded 
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that the state better regulate fracking.161 Collier County’s adminis-
trative challenge against FDEP placed pressure on the agency to re-
voke every permit that the Hughes Company had in Florida and to 
file suit against the Company.162 Additionally, the County influenced 
FDEP to respond with more regulatory measures regarding fracking, 
including commitments to increase its legislative authority to regu-
late, to increase the scope of inspection requirements, and to place 
the burden of clean-up requirements on oil companies. FDEP may be 
the jurisdiction that is more capable of optimal regulation because of 
its resources and financial backing as a state agency; however, to 
sustain optimal regulation, the County has to remain at the prover-
bial table and continue placing pressure on the agency. By joining 
FDEP’s lawsuit against the Hughes Company, the County is securing 
effective governance over fracking in this particular instance. 
 Another benefit of dynamic federalism is the checks and balances 
that a compound system provides: if one level fails to act, the other 
can assume the responsibility.163 Collier County provided a “regulato-
ry safety net” for its community by making demands of FDEP when 
its regulations and consequences for the Hughes Company were lack-
ing.164 The County’s additional pressure has caused FDEP to drill 
groundwater monitors to investigate water contamination at the well 
site.165 Additionally, overlapping jurisdiction ensures both that afflu-
ent interest groups are heard at the federal and state level and that 
opposing groups can also advocate for their interests at a lower level 
of government.166 Engaging Collier County with the state in the regu-
latory process of fracking is critical to ensuring that the voices of lo-
cal residents are heard and that their local officials have the oppor-
tunities to advocate for their concerns. Moreover, democracy is fur-
thered and individuals are best represented when local and state 
representatives interact with one another.  
 Dynamic federalism promotes regulatory innovation by encourag-
ing states to function as “laboratories of democracy” capable of exper-
imenting with policy without harming the rest of the nation.167 Local 
governments are also forums for innovation.168 Because the environ-
ment is continually changing, regulatory innovation is critical in re-
sponding to potential risks and in taking advantage of possible eco-
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nomic benefits.169 Innovative policy may be disseminated across mu-
nicipalities and up to the state level.170 Most importantly, interaction 
between different levels of government can lead “parties to adopt pol-
icy positions significantly different from the positions they would 
have adopted had they been regulating in a vacuum.”171 The dynamic 
interaction between FDEP and Collier County can serve as a model 
for how other states and counties can evolve their regulatory pos-
tures to most effectively regulate fracking. 
 Arguably, Collier County should not have yielded so quickly in 
dropping its administrative challenge against FDEP. However, the 
threat of litigation caused FDEP to respond to and address the Coun-
ty’s concerns. The County was the stepping-stone that caused FDEP 
to improve its regulatory activity. In joining FDEP’s suit against the 
Hughes Company and through its commitment to affect legislative 
change, the County has secured a position to meaningfully partici-
pate in the regulatory process. Additionally, Collier County’s stipu-
lated agreement with FDEP was essential in securing guarantees 
from the State and in ensuring the substantive outcomes promised. 
The Conservancy’s stipulated agreement with FDEP is an additional 
safeguard to protect the County.  
 While the County’s administrative challenge against FDEP along 
with its stipulated agreement provided the County with a critical role 
in the regulatory scheme and placed needed pressure on the agency, 
a pre-established procedure that invites both meaningful participa-
tion from and current information to the County would be more sus-
tainable, effective, and desirable. Legislation that requires local rep-
resentation to be involved in the regulatory process will offer checks 
and balances, create a regulatory safety net, and effectuate goals of 
best regulation practices. Nevertheless, the dynamic interaction be-
tween Collier County and FDEP has encouraged other municipalities 
and states to celebrate their overlapping jurisdiction and has provid-
ed them with a framework by which they can best regulate fracking. 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
 The regulation of fracking—a growing practice in the United 
States—is a complex endeavor that requires meaningful local and 
state involvement. Through battling FDEP, Collier County has 
caused the agency to improve its regulatory practices. And by joining 
FDEP in its suit against the Hughes Company, the County continues 
                                                                                                                                 
 169. See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1484, 1493 (1987) (explaining that “decentralization allows for innova-
tion and competition in government”).  
 170. Diller, supra note 17, at 1118-19. 
 171. Engel, supra note 152, at 171. 
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to apply pressure on FDEP to ensure continued best regulation. The 
dynamic interaction between the two levels of government has yield-
ed effective governance over fracking of the Collier-Hogan Well. By 
partnering with FDEP on this single suit against the Hughes Com-
pany, Collier County is laying the foundation for a continued part-
nership with the state agency going into the 2015 legislative session 
and beyond to draft bills that provide needed expectations for the oil 
and gas industry and that comport with the public’s environmental 
concerns. 
 Because dual federalism is unproductive and thus will not lead to 
good governance, state and local authorities should stop relying on it 
for the regulation fracking. Governments around the country should 
utilize a state-local dynamic federalism approach to realistically and 
effectively address the needs of this overlapping industry. By leaning 
into their overlapping jurisdiction, Collier County and FDEP offer 
the nation a model for effective governance. 
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